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Abstract
The ability to detect neutrons from the spontaneous fission of 238U in samples of depleted ura-
nium with organic liquid scintillation detectors is presented. In this paper we introduce a small
modular organic liquid scintillator detector array that can detect changes in mass of 238U be-
tween 3.69 g and 14.46 g. To do this, 18-hour assays of various masses of 0.3% wt. of depleted
uranium dioxide were assessed using four EJ-309 detectors, a mixed field analyser operated in
pulse gradient analysis mode, and associated counting components. We observe a background-
corrected fast neutron count sensitivity of (2.0 ± 0.3) × 10-4 n g-1 s-1 per detector. This research
demonstrates a proof of concept for depleted uranium quantity to be assessed passively on a
non-intrusive basis via its spontaneous fission decay.
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Highlights
• Passive assay of depleted uranium based on the spontaneous fission of 238U is reported.
• Assessment is demonstrated over a range in mass of 238U between 3.69 g and 14.46 g.
• A fast neutron count sensitivity of (2.0 ± 0.3) × 10-4 n g-1 s-1 per detector is observed.
1. Introduction
Depleted uranium is a by-product of the isotopic enrichment of uranium. It is defined as
having an isotopic abundance of 235U (and trace levels of 234U) that has been reduced, typically
< 0.2% wt. 235U, relative to that which occurs naturally at 0.72% wt. The vast majority of
depleted uranium (99.977% wt.) is therefore 238U. The reduced proportions of 234U and 235U
in depleted uranium render it approximately half the specific radioactivity of natural uranium,
at approximately 15 kBq per gram. Further, since this is mostly in the form of α decay and the
emitted radiation is short-ranged, depleted uranium poses little external radiation hazard.
Internally, exposure to depleted uranium can occur via inhalation, ingestion, percutaneous
absorption and dermal penetration, with inhalation being the most prominent pathway. The prin-
cipal sites of uranium disposition in the body are the kidneys, liver and bone. Toxicologically,
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234U 5.02 × 10−3 3.0 0.0038
235U 2.99 × 10−3 7.1 × 10−4 0.3
238U 0.0136 8.3 × 10−5 99.7
Table 1: Spontaneous fission (SF) and alpha-n (α, n) neutron contributions from common isotopes of uranium [6,
chap. 11]. Indicative mass percentages are included for the depleted uranium dioxide (DUO2) utilised for the work
presented in this research.
depleted uranium is both a heavy metal and a radioactive substance, with the health effects being
largely associated with its chemical toxicity rather than its radiological properties. Elemental ura-
nium is an active metal which dissolves readily in hydrochloric and nitric acids. It is pyrophoric
and, when finely divided, ignites spontaneously in air; such combustion typically yields UO2 and
U3O8, and the formation of some UO3 is possible after weathering. A number of comprehensive
reviews of its health effects have been made [1, 2, 3].
It is estimated that 1.5 million tonnes of depleted uranium is stockpiled throughout the world
as a result of enrichment associated with the use of uranium in power production and nuclear
weapons. Its uses are limited but include minor applications in radiation shielding (due to its sig-
nificant density) and as counterweights in aircraft. A few hundred tonnes of depleted uranium has
been used for military applications, particularly in the form of armour-piercing shells. Relatively
little has been used for this purpose, compared to the quantity which remains stockpiled, but it is
via this route that the majority of contamination of the natural environment has occurred in the
form of dusts and stray shells buried in the ground [4]. Perhaps the most attractive use in the
future is as the fertile material in fast-spectrum nuclear reactor systems, for which it constitutes
a significant source of energy.
Whilst neither fissile nor significantly radioactive, the majority of the world’s depleted ura-
nium stockpile exists in the form of uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) stored in cylinders, with
around 1547 kg and 8500 kg of DU in a full 30B and 48Y cylinder, respectively [5]. It is in
this form that it poses perhaps the greatest hazard due to its tendency to decompose in moist air
to yield the toxic products uranyl fluoride and hydrogen fluoride. This necessitates that storage
containers are inspected regularly for corrosion and damage.
Aside from α decay and γ-ray emissions, a small amount of spontaneous fission of 238U is
also observed, resulting in neutron emission at a rate of 0.0136 n g-1 s-1 [6, Table 11-1, p. 339].
As most nuclear reactor fuel contains relatively high proportions of 238U, this could be a valuable
property for the passive assay of nuclear materials, particularly those arising as by-products from
the enrichment process. Table 1 presents neutron yield rates for both spontaneous fission (SF)
and (α, n) reactions for the three most abundant isotopes of uranium, and mass percentages of
0.3% wt. depleted uranium, as used in this research.
The rate of spontaneous fission of 238U is lower than that exploited in a number of isotopes
of neighbouring elements for materials assay, particularly those of the even-numbered pluto-
nium isotopes, and consequently it has received less focus in terms of radiation measurement
research. However, given the ongoing requirement to ensure nuclear materials are accounted for
[7], safeguarded [8, p. 36] and that this is accomplished with minimal risk to people carrying
out the measurement [9], opportunities to assay nuclear material containing 238U passively and
non-intrusively should be investigated thoroughly [10].
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Method Constraints
Active neutron assay This method involves the use of neutrons to stimulate
fission in a sample, which can render the equipment
required more sophisticated than for passive methods,
particularly in terms of flexibility and portability. [13,
Chapter 1.6, p. 8]
γ-ray spectrometry γ rays are attenuated significantly by high-Z materials
and therefore do not penetrate large samples. Correc-
tions to the results from these measurements can be
made to account for the loss as a result of attenuation
but these often require a large amount of information
about the equipment and set-up. [6, Chapter 7.3.2,
p. 200]
Total γ-ray counting As above, γ rays do not penetrate high-Z materials
well. [11]
X-ray fluorescence (XRF) Cannot discern between isotopes of the same element
and so enrichment cannot be measured. [6, Chap-
ter 10, p. 313]
Passive neutron coincidence counting Coincidence counting at very low spontaneous fission
rates takes a considerably longer time than singles
counting. [6, Chapter 16, p. 457]
Table 2: A description of the constraints of a variety of techniques used to identify SNM and 235U enrichment compared
with a passive, singles fast neutron measurement.
In any given sample, the amount of 238U present is inversely proportional to enrichment of
235U, ignoring the trace levels of 234U. It can be inferred then, that measuring 238U can provide
composition information of the level of enrichment of 235U. The ability to measure 235U enrich-
ment is desirable across a variety of scenarios, such as in the monitoring of reprocessed uranium,
uranium ores, tails and in forensic applications. A variety of methods are used at present, includ-
ing γ-ray spectrometry [6, Chapter 7.3.2, p. 200], total γ-ray counting [11], X-ray fluorescence
(XRF) [6, Chapter 10, p. 313], spectrophotometry [12] and active neutron coincidence counting
[13, Chapter 1.6, p. 8]. In some situations a combination of these techniques is used to identify
source materials, and particularly Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), i.e., plutonium and uranium
enriched in 233U or 235U, and to determine isotopic composition. The possibility that fast neu-
trons arising from spontaneous fission might be used to identify and characterise a sample of
material has a number of potential benefits. A description of the constraints of the methods listed
above compared with single-fast neutron assay is given in Table 2.
Neutron emission rates can vary independently of enrichment, dependent upon both the ele-
mental and isotopic composition of the uranium compound constituting the sample in question.
The (α, n) reaction can play a significant role in this regard, particularly in the case of compounds
containing low-Z elements such as oxygen and fluorine. Uranium dioxide (UO2) exhibits a neu-
tron emission rate that is approximately constant until enrichments of around 60% wt. 235U. This
is because, whilst the spontaneous fission neutron rate decreases due to the fall in the proportion
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0.1977 0.0136 99.3 0.0001 0.7 0.0137
0.3000 0.0136 99.3 0.0001 0.7 0.0138
0.7108 0.0135 98.5 0.0002 1.5 0.0137
3.001 0.0132 94.3 0.0008 5.7 0.0140
18.15 0.0111 79.3 0.0029 20.7 0.0140
31.71 0.0093 66.9 0.0046 33.1 0.0139
57.38 0.0059 41.3 0.0084 58.7 0.0143
69.58 0.0042 28.4 0.0106 71.6 0.0148
97.65 0.0005 1.5 0.0318 98.5 0.0323
Table 3: Spontaneous Fission (SF) and alpha-n (α, n) neutron contributions across a range UO2 enrichments, adapted
from [6, p. 413-414].
ment and its associated α decay, until approximately 60% wt. 235U. Beyond this level, the (α, n)
component becomes dominant [6, Ch 14.2.2, p. 412] and hence the neutron emission rate begins
to increase. Adapting data from [6, p. 413-414] of neutron emission rate versus enrichment,
Table 3 can be produced, and plotted in Fig. 1.
To demonstrate the detection of neutrons from the spontaneous fission of depleted uranium
dioxide (DUO2), samples of a range of masses of 0.3% wt, DUO2 have been assessed in this
research by way of proof of concept. It was decided to vary mass rather than enrichment, due
to the approximately constant neutron emission rate from UO2 below 60% wt. 235U enrichment,
described earlier. This has been done to explore the conjecture that, if a significant difference
in neutron counts from each of the samples can be discerned, then this method might also be
applicable to measure enrichment in certain scenarios. The graph shown in [6, Fig 14.3, p. 415]
illustrates how the specific neutron emission rate of a number of uranium and plutonium ma-
terials and compounds varies with 235U enrichment. It depicts UF6, UO2F6, PuO2, and PuF4
all exhibiting significant differences in neutron production rate across the range of enrichments
plotted. The presence of these differences suggest that the proof of concept purported in this
paper could be adapted for total-singles-neutron counting of other compunds, as part of a suite
of measurements for SNM.
To date, neutrons from the spontaneous fission of 238U have been detected using a limited
number of methods, including track-etch detectors [14] and 3He detectors [15, Ch 14, p. 518][16].
Track-etch detectors allow a user to identify that a neutron has passed through the detector mate-
rial but give limited indication of the energy with which it passed. The detectors are chemically
hazardous and the signals they produce require somewhat intrusive post-processing in order to
gain a neutron count [17]. Perhaps the most prominent means of detection for neutrons are coun-
ters filled with 3He gas or, alternatively boron trifluoride. These detectors usually require the
thermalisation of the incident neutrons and consequently much of the spectroscopic information
about the neutrons is lost. Gas-filled detectors are also often used in coincidence or multiplicity
mode, i.e., to identify multiple neutrons associated with the same fission event. This technique
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Figure 1: Neutron emission rates for uranium dioxide, adapted from [6, p. 413-414].
gives the user information on double and triple detection rates which can be used, for example,
to infer the fissile mass of a given sample, and reduces the perturbation by neutrons that are not
correlated directly with fission.
As touched upon in Table 2, detecting coincident neutron events usually increases the time
necessary for an assessment in comparison to that based on the detection of single events. This
is due to the reduction in efficiency of the system, for example the detection of two neutrons in
coincidence is proportional to the square of the detector efficiency (ε2). Further, 3He is supply-
constrained and, as it has become less widely available, its cost has increased and alternatives
have been sought. Boron trifluoride, whilst a substitute, is potentially hazardous were it to leak
and be inhaled.
The use of organic liquid scintillator detectors provides a number of benefits over the two
approaches summarised above. The interaction mechanism between the liquid scintillation ma-
terial and an incoming neutron affords spectral information about the sample [18]. Fast neutrons
are detected directly in liquid scintillation detectors which, as well as retaining spectral informa-
tion, means that thermalisation is not necessary. This reduces the amount of heavy, cumbersome
material required as part of the fabric of a detector array; the detectors are also portable and mod-
ular, so they can be used in various arrangements without the need for moderator materials [19].
Gross γ-ray information, although not affording spectroscopy, can also be collected concurrently
with the neutron data, unlike 3He detectors. It is worthy of note that a great deal of operational
experience exists associated with the use of 3He and detector systems based on this have the
intrinsic benefits of long-term stability and immunity to γ-ray interference.
2. Method
The measurements described in this research were carried out in the Engineering Department
at Lancaster University, UK. The detection equipment consisted of four organic scintillation de-
tectors of type VS-1105-21 (Scionix, Netherlands) containing EJ-309 scintillant (Eljen Technol-
ogy, Sweetwater, TX) [20], a 4-channel Mixed Field Analyser, model MFAX4.3 (MFA, Hybrid
Instruments Ltd., U.K.) [21], a custom data acquisition module [22] and a conventional laptop
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Figure 2: A photograph and drawings of the detector array used for the assessment of spontaneous fission neutrons from
0.3% wt. DUO2 in this research. The dimensions stated here (in mm) were used for simulating the detector set-up in
MCNP-6.
computer. Each measurement was performed for 18 hours. The detectors were placed in an or-
thogonal arrangement around a central void in which the samples were placed, as shown in Fig. 2.
The four EJ-309 organic scintillation detectors were sandwiched between two layers of 10-mm
thickness, high-density polyethylene, which reduced the influence of ambient background, par-
ticularly that from cosmic sources, the reduction was measured to be 1.48%. A background
measurement was also employed to correct for ambient and cosmic sources of radiation. The
background measurement was taken over the same period of the 24 hour clock as the experi-
ments, to remove contributions by the diurnal effect on background, the greatest contributor to
background radiation variation [23]. Cosmically-induced fissions were considered; comparing
the volume of the detectors used (1200 cm3) to the volume of the samples used (0.38 - 1.50 cm3),
the detectors have a volume that is a factor of 3.2×10−4 - 12.5×10−4 greater. Given that in lead
(Pb), a suitable surrogate in this case for DUO2, a cosmic flux produces a ratio of outgoing neu-
trons to incoming neutrons of 2.4 [24], our samples produce 7.68×10−4 - 30.0×10−4 neutrons per
neutron detected directly from cosmic events. With the rates being this low, they were neglected
for the measurements taken here, however, if larger samples or materials with greater fissionable
mass were to be measured using this technique, this calculation would not stand and the new
samples would need to be re-considered with respect to cosmically-induced fission.
Due to the close proximity of the four detectors, the effect of inter-detector scattering (cross-
talk between detectors) was investigated experimentally and in MCNP-6 [25]. The data from
a single detector were compared to a four-detector array in order to quantify the number of
extra neutrons observed with the four-detector array as a result. However, the neutron count (per
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detector) was consistently higher for the single detector arrangement, by approximately 25%. It is
proposed that the increase in hydrogenous material from one to four detectors moderates neutrons
within the geometry and down-scatters them below the detector threshold at approximately 0.5
MeV [26]. This spectrum softening was tested in two MCNP-6 models, one with an array of four
detectors and one with just one detector, the results of which can be seen in Fig. 3. The model
measured the neutron flux in one detector when on its own, and when in a four-detector array, the
results of which passed all inherent MCNP statistical tests and had acceptable fractional standard
deviations in line with [27]. The neutron flux below 0.5 MeV was shown to be greater in the four-
detector array, and above 0.5 MeV the neutron flux was greater in the single-detector, thus the
softening of the spectrum was shown to be plausible; an intrinsic influence of the measuring
system on the field as measured. The mean flux was calculated to be 11.35% higher for the
single detector alone, than when in a four-detector arrangement, broadly in agreement with the
25% measured experimentally. The difference between these two results could be attributed to
bleedthrough in the PSD at low energies, where neutrons and γ rays can be confused. In contrast
MCNP-6 does not have this issue, and reports definitive numbers of neutrons and γ rays. There
have been multiple papers published providing correction factors for cross-talk measurements
[28, 29, 30, 31]. Our sample emission rates were deemed too low to be able to confidently,
statistically correct for the scattered neutrons. For the purposes of this experiment, the measured
factor of 25% and the simulated factor of 11.35% imply that the effects of scatter are not a
significant source of over-response for our four-detector array, but in fact depressing the number
of counts measured here. Self shielding within the samples was not investigated due to the small
volumes of the samples used. These scattering results open a debate as to whether increasing the
solid angle of detector coverage is outweighed by the spectrum softening that will occur, when
trying to increase detection efficiency of systems similar to that used here.
The detectors were calibrated via the MFA software operated in pulse gradient analysis
(PGA) mode and with a 137Cs source to obtain consistent response functions across all four
detectors [32]. The Compton edges of each detector were aligned and a suitable neutron/γ-
ray pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) threshold was applied. Once calibrated, the neutron and
γ-ray TTL outputs from the MFA were connected to a data counter and a measurement of back-
ground radiation was carried out, comprising the detector array with no sample present. The
latter was subtracted from the results obtained after assessing the DUO2 samples in order to give
the background-corrected radiation count for each sample. Following the background count,
each DUO2 sample was assessed in turn. Details of the samples used in this research are given
in Table 4 along with predicted neutron emission rates for each sample. The DUO2 was used
in the form of slices of a depleted uranium pellet, each of mass up to 2 g. These pellet slices
were combined to constitute the masses used during these assays. The pellets were stored inside
air-tight plastic bags which were placed inside a plastic box.
The data counter was used in a logging mode to sum the number of neutron and γ-ray counts
produced by each detector at intervals of approximately 1.15 s. The total number of neutrons and
γ rays counted in each detector were then recorded. Each measurement resulted in eight pieces
of information: the neutron and γ-ray count for each of the four detectors. Systematic errors
were reduced by the use of a logging function rather than a real-time counter as this allowed
for analysis of the second-by-second data. This was used to confirm that the detected radiation
exhibited a Poisson distribution. The logging function also enabled the stability of the electronics
to be checked periodically.
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A B 1 Detector ∑ ( f x)/(x) = 0.341
4 Detectors ∑ ( f x)/(x) = 0.302
Difference = 11.35 %
1 Detector
4 Detectors
Figure 3: Results from an MCNP-6 model showing a spectral softening of the neutron flux in the same detector when
four detectors are present in comparison to just one detector. This validates the experimental test which concluded that
scattering of neutrons within the four-detector array was not increasing the number of neutrons detected per detector,
but reducing them, due to the EJ-309 detectors having low efficiencies at low neutron energies. The neutron flux below
0.5 MeV was shown to be greater in the four-detector array, and above 0.5 MeV the neutron flux was greater in the
single-detector. The mean neutron flux across the range of energy 0-10 MeV was calculated to be 11.35% higher for the
same detector alone, than within a four-detector array. At 0.7 MeV the single detector overtakes the efficiency of the
same detector in a four-detector array.






4.20 3.69 0.050 3.69 × 10−4
7.97 7.00 0.095 7.00 × 10−4
12.25 10.77 0.146 10.77 × 10−4
16.45 14.46 0.197 14.46 × 10−4
Table 4: Details of 0.3 % wt. DUO2 samples assessed in this research, along with associated spontaneous fission (SF)















4.20 3.69 274 ± 83 0.004± 0.001 1.71± 0.04% 264.6 ± 0.1
7.97 7.00 333 ± 84 0.005± 0.001 3.01± 0.03% 464.0 ± 0.1
12.25 10.77 591 ± 85 0.009± 0.001 4.73± 0.02% 730.7 ± 0.1
16.45 14.46 911 ± 87 0.014± 0.001 6.55± 0.02% 1011.2 ± 0.2
Table 5: Net counts of neutron and γ rays during 18-hour passive assessments as a function of DUO2 mass. Errors were
propagated from a square root of the background and the measured values.
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y = (52± 7)x+ (−5± 64)∑
χ2v = 21.5
Figure 4: Net number of neutron counts summed over four detectors from the assay of various masses of 0.3% wt.
depleted uranium dioxide over 18 hours (a line of best fit, errors of 1σ and reduced chi-squared are included; where x
equals the mass of uranium dioxide (g) and y equals the net neutron counts).
3. Results
The results of the four measurements are presented as net results when background com-
ponents are subtracted from the gross counts, and the results in Table 5 are obtained. Errors
associated with each measurement have been propagated using the square root of both the back-
ground count and the measured values. The relatively high ratio or error for the net neutron count
is an artefact of the large background count measured due to the prolonged measurement time.
This time period was necessary due to the low neutron emission rate from the sample.
The net results are also presented in graphical form to allow for easier interpretation. Fig-
ures 4 and 5 show the net neutron count and net γ-ray count respectively. From the graphs
presented throughout, the lines-of-best-fit and χν2 values have been collated and are presented
in Table 6. This table also presents fit parameters for equations of lines that describe the sensi-
tivity of the approach used here. This information has been calculated by normalising the data
collected in terms of counts per second, per detector, per gram of DUO2.
4. Analysis
The net neutron count from each of the samples studied in this research exhibits a positive
trend with mass, with a line-of-best-fit equal to y = (52 ± 7) x + (−5 ± 64); where x equals the
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Figure 5: Net number of γ-ray counts summed over four detectors, from the assay of various masses of 0.3% wt. depleted
uranium dioxide, over 18 hours (a line of best fit, errors of 1σ and reduced chi-squared are included; where x equals the
mass of uranium dioxide (g) and y equals the net γ-ray counts). The size of the reduced chi-squared value is discussed in
Section 4; the dashed line is used here to guide the reader’s eye.
CPS per detector per g (UO2)
Form of equation of line: y = (m ± ∆m)x + (c ± ∆c)
Result type m ∆ m c ∆ c χν2
Net neutron:
Fig. 4
2.01 ×10−04 3×10−05 -2.05×10−05 2×10−04 8.0×10−05
Net γ ray:
Fig. 5
1.51×10+01 2×10−03 -9.65×10−02 2×10−02 0.128
Table 6: Fit parameters for the results obtained in Table 5. The table is split into two sections, giving fit parameters for
different shapes of fit-line as described above each section, normalised to their Counts Per Second (CPS) per detector per
gram of DUO2. χν2 values for each line-of-fit are also included, the large values are discussed and analysed in section 4.
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Figure 6: Predicted and measured neutron emission and detection rates at various masses of 0.3% wt. depleted uranium
dioxide (errors of 1 standard deviation, a line of best fit, and reduced chi-squared are included; where x equals the
predicted neutron emission rate from Table 4 (n s−1) and y equals the measured neutron count rate from Table 5 (n s−1)).
mass of uranium dioxide (g) and y equals the net neutron count. As stated earlier, PSD allows
discriminationof neutrons and γ rays. The net γ-ray count also shows a positive trend, with a line
of best fit equal to y = (3.9 × 106 ± 6 × 102) x + (−2.4 × 104 ± 5 × 103); where x equals the mass
of uranium dioxide (g) and y equals the net γ-ray count.
Plotting the predicted neutron emission rate of each sample against the measured neutron
count rate produces Fig. 6. This positive correlation gives an absolute efficiency of the detector
system of ∼7%. Given that the solid angle of the detector system is roughly 2/3 of 4-pi space (four
sides of a cube around the samples are comprised of detector material), the average energy of a
238U spontaneous fission neutron is 0.8 MeV [33], and EJ-309 detection efficiency at this energy
is ∼20% with a 0.1 MeVee threshold [26], we would expect an average absolute efficiency in
the region of 13.3%. This average absolute efficiency ignores errors with each of these measure-
ments (predicted neutron emission rate, measured neutron rate, efficiency of detector system, and
average neutron energy emitted) that would require intensive computational effort to convolute
and combine, for little benefit. The simplistic predicted efficiency of the system also fails to take
into account errors associated with using PSD techniques, particularly at low neutron energies,
self-shielding, and induced fission neutron energies. With this knowledge of the inadequacies of
our predicted efficiency, we believe our measured 7% efficiency and the predicted 13% efficiency
are suitably similar.
There are limited comparisons to be drawn between this method and previous reports due to
the low fission neutron emission rate of 238U, resulting in there being relatively little investigation
of its potential for uranium assessment. Research into the detection of neutron emissions from
the spontaneous fission of 238U has focussed predominantly on measuring the decay constant
[34, 35, 36, 37]. An ionization chamber has been used for similar studies using low-mass, heavy-
element samples [38]. In that report, 2800 events of 238U spontaneous fission were measured, at
a similar count rate. However, the applications of such technology are not readily comparable
with the methods discussed here. Most ionisation chambers are stationary and have samples
brought to them. Whilst portable ionisation chambers exist, they have much lower efficiencies
than the detector system described here. It is feasible for the system described in this paper to
be packed up and transported onto nuclear sites for the passive assessment of materials, in-situ.
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Goddard and Croft [39] assayed U3O8 passively, concluding that nuclear data available at that
time was insufficient to create useful models of the reactions. The paper focused on multiplicity
measurements and aligns with the work in this paper with regards to the SF and (α, n) reaction
rates. Of the neutron-singles data presented, the research suggests that MCNPX models align
well with measured data, although there is negative trend in the ratio as enrichment increases [39,
Fig. 8]. At 0.3% wt. enrichment, as utilised in the work carried out for this paper, there are no
data, and the closest point to this has a ratio of ∼1.022 between the measured and MCNPX values.
This suggests that the MCNP-6 model used in this work is reliable. There are inconsistencies
between the research presented here, and [39, Fig. 11] with respect to the declared singles count
rate efficiencies. Goddard and Croft [39] states that efficiencies for SF neutrons are between
66.5% and 67.0% for all enrichments of U3O8, and we declare efficiency of ∼7%. However the
detection systems are different, and [39] uses the Los Alamos Epithermal Neutron Multiplicity
Counter (ENMC). The ENMC is constructed of 3He tubes which detect neutrons across the whole
spectrum of energies. It would be expected that the ENMC would have a much greater efficiency
than the EJ-309 detectors utilised in this research given the spectrum of SF neutrons from 238U
[33].
The PSD data produced during each of the assessments that comprise this experiment were
plotted to ensure that the neutron and γ-ray plumes were as expected. Each of the five assays
contained patches of noise above the γ-ray plume, as presented in Fig. 7. It is expected that
these patches of noise are an artefact of running the assessments for long periods of time, and the
effects of the noise can be seen clearly in the chi-squared values for the net-γ-ray count (Fig. 5).
As all the noise artefacts (clouds) are manifested above the neutron/γ-ray threshold, in the γ-ray
region, the neutron data presented here are considered to be sound and unaffected by this effect.
Calculations show that these clouds account for less than 0.16% of the radiation events counted
here. Further research is under way to identify the origin of this noise and eliminate the clouds
alltogether.
In order to quantify the proportion of neutrons from the (α, n) reaction, a SOURCES sim-
ulation of this particular sample was conducted [40]. The neutron production rate of 0.3% wt.
DUO2 is given as 7.17 × 10 -5 n g-1 s-1. This rate of neutron production is a factor of ∼189 less
than the neutron production rate of spontaneous neutrons from 238U, and so, when considering
the results it is reasonable to consider the neutron flux from the (α, n) reaction as negligible
relative to that from spontaneous fission.
5. Future Work
Although the erroneous noise patches in the γ-region of the PSD data have been quantified
here, the source of these patches should be identified. If the system were to be considered for
measuring greater quantities of SNM, methods would need to be devised to correct for neutron
multiplication effects, cosmically-induced fission, α, n contributions, and isotopics of the sample.
This would not be an insignificant task.
6. Conclusion
The ability to detect neutrons using organic liquid scintillation detectors passively, predomi-
nantly from the spontaneous fission of 238U in uranium dioxide has been demonstrated. Masses
of 238U between 3.69 g and 14.46 g have been assessed over 18-hour periods. This method has
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Figure 7: A histogram of PSD data from long term measurement (46 hours) of background radiation showing clouds of
noise in the γ-ray region. No neutron/γ-ray threshold is plotted as no neutron source was present.
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potential applications in the nuclear industry in scenarios associated with radioactive waste as-
say, total uranium assessment of ores, tails monitoring, environmental assessment and in forensic
analysis. The method utilises four EJ-309 detectors and could be scaled up easily on a modular
basis to assess larger quantities of 238U-containing material. The method presented here also
shows promise for measuring total uranium content of bulk quantities of substance. At present,
this method is presented as a proof of concept with an emphasis on the passive measurement
of very low neutron emission rates. Further work would be required to bring the method up to
technical readiness if it were to be deployed in real life scenarios.
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